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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether there is governmental immunity for plaintiff

James D. Ericksen's claim against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake
Airport Authority. The district court's statutory interpretation
is reviewed for correctness by this Court with no particular
deference to the conclusion of the trial court.

State v. Rio

Vista Oil, Limited, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).
2.

Whether Salt Lake City is entitled to express indemnity

from Projects Unlimited under the written contract between them.
The district courts conclusions of law are reviewed de novo by
this Court. State v. Rio Vista Oil, Limited, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah
1990).
STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1990 Amend.), formerly § 6330-10(1) (d) , which preserves governmental immunity "if the injury
arises out of . . . a failure to make an inspection or by making
an inadequate or negligent inspection."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff James D. Ericksen was injured in a fall from a
ladder on March 5, 1987, while employed by Projects Unlimited,
Inc., general contractor for the construction of a maintenance
building

for Salt Lake City Corporation

at the Salt Lake

International Airport. He alleged that the City inspector at the
Airport negligently caused the ladder to fall while inspecting
the construction.
Salt Lake City and its Airport Authority appeal from the
trial court's

failure to dismiss them

on the ground

that

Ericksen7s claim for bodily injury arose by reason of City
Inspector

Millard

Rice

"making

an

inadequate

or

negligent

inspection" of property undetr Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (d)
(1965) .
Salt Lake City also appeals from the trial court's denial of
contractual

indemnity

to

Salt

Lake

City

against

Projects

Unlimited.
Statement of Facts
1.

The accident to James Ericksen occurred when Salt Lake

City Construction Inspector, Millard Rice, during the course of
an inspection on behalf of Salt Lake City, inadvertently raised
an electric overhead door against which was resting a ladder on
which Ericksen was working, dislodging the ladder and causing
Ericksen to fall several feet to the cement floor and sustain a
lower back injury.
2.

After

the

(R. 289 pp. 10-11).
circumstances

were

identified

through

depositions of Mr. Ericksen and Mr. Rice, Salt Lake City moved
for summary judgment on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(1)(d) specifically did not waive governmental immunity for
injury arising by reason of making a negligent inspection of any
2

property. The trial court denied that motion.

(R. 287, 288, 55-

56) .
3.
Projects

Salt Lake City then joined the general contractor,
Unlimited,

indemnity

under

the

Inc.,

as

written

a

third-party

construction

defendant

contract

for

between

Projects Unlimited and Salt Lake City which required Projects
Unlimited to indemnify the City from all claims, including claims
by employees of the parties, which may arise out of the work or
other

activity

contractor.
4.

related

in any way

to the project

by the

(R. 62-69) .

After discovery, Salt Lake City and Projects Unlimited

each moved for summary judgment against the other based on the
written contract. The court granted Projects Unlimited's motion
and denied Salt Lake City's motion, dismissing Salt Lake City's
third-party complaint in full on the ground that the contract
language did not require Projects Unlimited to indemnify Salt
Lake City for Salt Lake City's negligence, and Mr. Ericksen would
be allowed to recover against Salt Lake City only for Salt Lake
City's negligence and not for Projects Unlimited's negligence, so
there was no need for contractual indemnity to Salt Lake City for
the negligence of Projects Unlimited.
5.

(R. 248-51).

The action went to jury trial on March 5-7, 1991,

resulting in a verdict that Ericksen was 10% negligent, Salt Lake
City was 50% negligent, and Projects Unlimited was 40% negligent
in causing

the

accident.

Total
3

damages were

assessed

of

$186,200. At trial, the court denied Salt Lake City's request to
instruct the jury on governmental immunity and to present the
governmental immunity issue to the jury on the special verdict.
(R. 195-199, 289 pp. 38-41).
6.

Based on the jury verdict, the court entered judgment

against Salt Lake City for 50% of the damages, plus costs and
interest on the special damages. This appeal followed.

(R. 266-

70) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY:

By statutory mandate, the operation

of the Salt Lake Airport is a governmental activity protected
from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
(Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1524, formerly § 2-5-24).

The Utah

Governmental Immunity Act preserves immunity where an injury
arises by reason of making a negligent inspection of property
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4), formerly § 63-30-10(1)(d)).

The

Governmental Immunity Act should be applied in this instance to
free government inspectors from the threat of tort liability
arising from the inspection activity. The purpose of the statute
is to protect government inspections which benefit all citizens
who pay for or use public goods and services. Sovereign immunity
should not be taken away from the inspection process where the
statute clearly extends to inspections.
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY: The construction contractor Ericksen
was working for, Projects Unlimited, contracted with the City to
4

protect it against all claims, including claims by its employees,
arising out of the contractor's work on the project.

This

comprehensive agreement requires Projects Unlimited to indemnify
the City for the damages of Projects Unlimited's employee James
Ericksen who was injured in the course of Projects Unlimited's
work under the contract (Article 15 of "Agreement11 dated April 9,
1986, R. 122).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Court should reverse the denial of summary judgment to
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake Airport Authority against Ericksen.
The Court should also reverse the summary judgment in favor of
Projects Unlimited and the denial of Salt Lake City's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Projects Unlimited, and remand to the
district court for entry of judgment for litigation expenses
against Projects Unlimited.
Ericksen has cross-appealed and filed a Docketing Statement
asserting that the verdict should not be reduced by the 40%
negligence of Projects Unlimited.

If Ericksen prevails on this

argument, Salt Lake City should be awarded indemnity against
Projects Unlimited for the 40% negligence of Projects Unlimited
which caused the accident.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROHIBITS ERICKSEN'S
ACTION AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY AND SALT LAKE
AIRPORT AUTHORITY.
By statutory mandate in Utah, the functions and operations
of the Salt Lake Airport are* governmental activities protected
from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The "Utah Public Airport Authority Act", Utah Code Ann.
§ 2-5-1 et seq. provides at 2-5-24:
2-5-24. Governmental capacity of authority.
Each authority created under this Act is
declared to be performing public functions
and operating in a governmental capacity and
has all powers prescribed in this Act.
The 1990 Amendment renumbered this section as § 17A-2-1524 and
substituted "part" for "Act".
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act restates the common law
of

sovereign

immunity

from tort liability

for governmental

functions:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental
function, . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3.
This Court has held repeatedly that this section indicates
an intention that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act be strictly
applied to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as
6

clearly

expressed

in

the

Act.

Holt

v.

Utah

State

Road

Commission, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d
242 (Utah 1976).
There is no waiver of governmental immunity in this case
where plaintiff

claims his

injury

arose by reason

governmental employee making a negligent inspection.

of the
The Utah

Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment, except for certain areas in which
immunity is not waived, including injury which "(d) arises out of
a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of any property;". Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(d).
This section means there is governmental immunity for injury
arising by reason of making a negligent

inspection of any

property.
The facts of the accident through deposition testimony and
trial testimony are as follows:
1.

Mr. Millard Rice, 59 years old at the time, had been a

construction inspector at the Salt Lake Airport for ten years as
an employee of Salt Lake City.
2.

(R. 287 pp. 4-5).

Mr. Rice has an office at the Airport and his job is to

go around to the different construction projects at the Airport
and inspect them.

(R. 287 pp. 6-7) .

7

3.

His job is to see that construction contractors do

their work for the Airport according to the plans and specifications.
4.

(R. 287 p. 9 lines 4-5; R. 289 p. 18).
Mr. Rice inspects whatever construction work is being

done, and if there is something that is not done according to the
plans and specifications, he reports to the superintendent of the
general contractor, so corrections can be made.

(R. 287 p. 13

lines 10-22).
5.

On

March

5,

1987,

Mr.

Rice

was

inspecting

the

construction of a maintenance facility building at the Airport.
(R. 287 p. 7 lines 21-23).
6.

The general contractor was Projects Unlimited, and

plaintiff James Ericksen was an employee of Projects Unlimited.
(R. 287 p. 10 line 2-5; p. 13 lines 7-9).
7.

Mr. Rice was walking around the construction project

with the owner of Projects Unlimited and the superintendent of
Projects Unlimited, in the course of inspecting the various
details of construction on a punch list.

(R. 287 p. 16 lines 16-

22; p. 17 lines 19-24).
8.

The maintenance facility building has rows of large

garage-type overhead doors located one after another, fourteen on
each side, with the electric control button for each door mounted
on the wall between each door and the next door.

Each control

panel would open and close the door directly to the left.
287 p. 18 lines 13-15; p. 30 lines 10-18; R. 289 p. 6).
8

(R.

9.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Rice and the two men

from Projects Unlimited had reached the item on the inspection
list which pertained to the rubber seal which ran along the
bottom of each door. Mr. Rice was inspecting this rubber seal on
one of the doors, and to do so he pushed the electric control
button to open the door slightly, so he could more accurately
inspect the rubber seal at the bottom of the door.

(R. 287 p. 17

line 19 to p. 18 line 10).
10.

Mr. Rice was inspecting the door directly to his right,

and pushed the control button expecting that door to open.
However, that particular control operated the door to his left,
which started to open, dislodging a ladder on which James
Ericksen was working, and Mr. Ericksen fell a few feet to the
floor.
11.

(R. 287 p. 18 lines 7-10; p. 23 lines 6-14).
James Ericksen, age 25, and employed

by Projects

Unlimited, was on the ladder painting a sprinkler pipe on orders
from his supervisor at Projects Unlimited.

(R. 288 p. 4; p. 26,

line 23 to p. 27 line 8; R. 289 p. 25-26).
12.

The work James Ericksen was performing at the time of

the accident in painting a small piece of sprinkler pipe was also
work resulting from the inspection of punch list items.

(R. 287

p. 13 line 23 to p. 15 line 22; R. 288 p. 27 lines 3-4).
13.

After he fell, Mr. Ericksen was x-rayed and released at

Pioneer Valley Hospital.

(R. 288 p. 9 lines 13-19).

He later

developed lower back pain symptoms for which he is receiving
9

worker's compensation benefits and for which he claims damages in
this lawsuit.

(R. 288 p. 21 to p. 22 line 15).

The claims directed against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake
Airport

Authority

are

that

Ericksen's

injury

arose

from

negligence of inspector Millard Rice in making his inspection of
the rubber seal along the bottom of the door.

This is a claim

protected by governmental immunity.
POINT II.
IF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AROSE BY REASON OF
MILLARD RICE MAKING A NEGLIGENT INSPECTION,
THERE IS GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
The

immunity

preserved

by

§ 63-30-10(d)

extends to the

following, under the terms of the statute:
(1)

Immunity for injuries arising out of failure to

make an inspection;
(2)

Immunity

for

injuries by reason

of making

an

inadequate inspection; and
(3)

Immunity

for

injuries

by

reason

of

making

a

negligent inspection of any property.
Plaintiff's complaint asserted that Mr. Rice was negligent
in his inspection, and the jury found that his negligence was 50%
at fault in proximately causing the accident.
A quick reading of subsection (d) might give the impression
it applies only where the injury itself is caused by a dangerous
condition not revealed through inspection.

This is not true.

the legislature had meant to limit subsection
10

If

(d) to injuries

from an inadequate inspection, the legislature would not have
added the additional language preserving immunity for injuries
arising from a negligent inspection.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that all words
in a statute were placed there purposefully and should be given
effect.
As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 250:
In the interpretation of a statute, the
legislature will be presumed to have
inserted every part thereof for a purpose.
Thus, it should not be presumed that any
provision of a statute is redundant.
A
statute should not be construed in such
manner as to render it partly ineffective or
inefficient if another construction will
make it effective. Indeed it is a cardinal
rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should, if possible without
destroying the sense or effect of the law,
be accorded to every part of the act,
including every section, paragraph, sentence
or clause, phrase, and word.
This general rule of statutory construction is followed in
Utah. In Metropolitan Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
City. 380 P.2d 721 (Utah 1963), the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
A well recognized
rule of statutory
construction requires the court to assume
that all words in a statute were placed
there advisedly and that all should be given
meaning wherever possible.
Id. at 724. Accord, Purfee v. Board of Education of Wayne County
School

Dist. . 604

P.2d

480,

484

(Utah

1979);

Rickenbach's Estate, 186 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1947).
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and

111 Re

Both the "inadequate" and "negligent inspection" wordings
should be construed to have separate and distinct meanings: The
"inadequate" language applies in cases where injury or damage
occurred

subsequent

to a superficial

inspection, while the

"negligent" language applies in cases where injury or damage
resulted from breaching a standard of care in the course of the
inspection itself, as in this case.
As stated in Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934
(Utah 1980):
It is to be observed, moreover, that
statutory enactments are to be so construed
as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, and that interpretations are to
be avoided which render some part of a
provision nonsensical or absurd.
Id. at 936.
Cases from other state and federal jurisdictions support
this rule of statutory construction.
In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell. 648 P.2d 935
(Cal. 1982) , the California Supreme Court stated:
In construing the words of a statute or
constitutional provision to discern its
purpose, the provisions should be read
together; and interpretation which would
render terms surplusage should be avoided,
and every word should be given some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of
meaning.
Id. at 938 (citations omitted).

Accord, Cox v. Helenius, 693

P.2d 683, 686 (Wash. 1985); Thompson v. Wyoming Instream Flow
Comm.. 651 P.2d 778, 787 (Wyo. 1982).

Also, in Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d
347 (7th Cir. 1983) , the court cited from several other circuits
in stating the following:
As a general rule, a court should not
construe a statute in a way that makes words
or phrases meaningless, redundant, or
superfluous.
Id. at 353 (citations omitted). Accord, United States v. Handy,
761 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
American Guarantee Life Ins., 722 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).
POINT III,
IMMUNITY IN THIS CASE WILL FURTHER THE
OBVIOUS LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING
AND ENCOURAGING INSPECTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT
OF ALL CITIZENS.
The obvious point of the immunity protection given by § 6330-10(d) is to promote inspections in connection with governmental activities, by freeing those performing the inspections
from the threat of tort liability arising from the inspection
activity.

The goal of promoting and encouraging inspection has

a clear public policy value in providing all citizens optimum
goods and services in governmental areas. This public policy is
clearly present from the facts in this case:
(1) Mr. Rice was acting in the course and scope of his
official duties as an inspector, and he was acting in furtherance
of the details of his inspection when he attempted to raise the
overhead door, leading to the accident.

13

His specific conduct

which led to the accident was not incidental to the inspection.
It was at the very core of the inspection activity.
(2) If this inspection activity should incur tort liability
on Salt Lake City, the next time a similar situation arises, the
temptation will be to avoid an inspection or perform a more
limited inspection, so as to minimize the chance of "doing something wrong" and incurring a tort claim.
government

employees

Thorough inspections by

should be encouraged.

It was a direct

result of the thoroughness of Mr. Rice's inspection that he chose
to try to raise the overhead door slightly to better examine the
plastic seal on the bottom of the door.
(3) This inspection was being conducted to punch list the
work of a private contractor on a government job. The inspection
was part of the procedure to try to insure that the government,
and therefore the people, get what they pay for in government
contracts.
purpose.

The clear meaning in the statute gives effect to this
A constricted interpretation which would chill this

governmental activity should be rejected.
(4) Plaintiff James Ericksen was an employee of the general
contractor whose work was being inspected.

Mr. Ericksen was

fully entitled to workers compensation benefits for his claim of
injury.

The cost of premiums for workers compensation insurance

to protect

employees

such

as Mr.

Ericksen,

was

one

of

the

overhead items that Projects Unlimited should have had in mind
when it negotiated its contract with the Airport Authority. By
14

enforcing the rule of governmental immunity in this case, this
court will not be leaving plaintiff James Ericksen without any
remedy•
This Court interprets statutes in the way that will "best
promote the protection of the public."

Clover v. Snowbird Ski

Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Curtis v. Harmon Elec.,
Inc. . 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
protection

to

the

Utah

public

is

The best promotion of
to

encourage

thorough

inspections to disclose defects and inadequate workmanship and
correct

them.

Many

aspects

of

inspection,

especially

on

construction projects, involve aspects of the soundness of the
construction directly related to safety of those who will use the
facilities.

Likewise, all citizens are affected by the cost of

liability claims caused by construction defects undetected by
inspection. An incidental cost of the inspection process is the
possibility that the presence of inspectors at the location of
the work will result in accidents such as this one. However, in
the overall view, the safety interest and the economic interest
of citizens is best served by promoting thorough inspections and
protecting government entities from liability claims incident to
the inspection process.

15

POINT IV.
PROJECTS UNLIMITED'S INDEMNITY AGREEMENT TO
SALT LAKE CITY IS COMPREHENSIVE AND SHOULD
BE ENFORCED UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH LAW.
Article 15 of the construction contract between Projects
Unlimited and the City reads as follows:
ARTICLE 15.
LIABILITY.
The Contractor
agrees to at all times protect, indemnify,
save harmless and defend the City, its
agents and employees from any and all
claims,
demands,
judgments,
expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and
all other damages of every kind and nature
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf
of any person or persons whomsoever,
including the parties hereto and their
employees, which may arise out of any act or
failure to act, work or other activity
related in any way to the project, by the
said Contractor, its agents, subcontractors,
materialmen or employees in the performance
and execution of this Agreement.
(R. 122).
This indemnity agreement is comprehensive and should be
enforced.

Article 15 says nothing about limiting recovery to

percentage of fault of the contractor.

Article 15 says that if

the accident arose out of the work of Projects Unlimited, then
Projects Unlimited will indemnify in full and defend the City.
The interpretation of a written contract may be a question
of law for resolution by the court.

L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol

Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co.
v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
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Utah law is well settled that agreements stated this clearly
and comprehensively

should be enforced.

Shell Oil Co, v.

Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. . 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1983);
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Company, 793 P.2d 362, 368 (Utah
1990).
In the

Freund

case, which

is Utah's most

recent and

authoritative statement of the law, a unanimous Court enforced
against the employer an indemnity agreement substantially similar
to the one in the instant case.

793 P.2d at 371.

The Court also held that it is entirely appropriate to
evaluate

the

objectives

of

circumstances.

indemnification
the

parties

agreement

and

the

according

surrounding

to

the

facts

and

In the instant case, Projects Unlimited was a

large general contractor experienced in negotiating at arms'
length.

This agreement was reached between two sophisticated

business entities.

The City knew that as general contractor,

Projects Unlimited would have control of day-to-day operations on
the work site.

This would necessarily

conditions affecting safety.

include control of

It was entirely reasonable for the

City to require as a condition of the contract that Projects
Unlimited indemnify the City for any and all claims arising from
this work.1
1

The language in Article 15 of the agreement which holds
Projects Unlimited responsible for liability "which may arise out
of any act or failure to act, work or other activity related in any
way to the project, by the said contractor" is similar to other
17

contract language which courts have interpreted to find the
contractor liable for indemnity for injury to employees of the
contractor working on the owner's property, occasioned by acts of
the owner's employees.
Annotation, Building contractor's
liability, upon bond or other agreement to indemnify owner, for
injury or death of third persons resulting from owner's negligence.
28 A.L.R.3d 663 (1969), especially § 19(b), which discusses cases
in which indemnity to the owner was upheld for injury to the
contractor's employees resulting from negligence by the owner.
In the following cases, based on the express indemnity
language in the written agreement between the owner and the
contractor, the court required the contractor to indemnify the
owner for injury to an employee of the contractor occasioned by
activity of the owner's employees on the owner's premises where the
contractor was performing its work.
In Newberg Constr. Co. v. Fischbach. Moore & Morrissey. Inc..
196 N.E.2d 513 (111. App. 1964) , the court held the contractor
liable under an agreement to indemnify for claims "caused by,
resulting from, arising out of, or occurring in connection with the
execution of the work."
In Buffa v. General Motors Corp., 131 F. Supp. 478 (D.C. Mich.
1955), the court held the construction contractor liable for
indemnity to the owner for injury to persons "on or in connection
with the work." The court stated that it was only natural that the
owner should demand protection even from the consequences of its
own acts in carrying on its usual business, where the contractor
was using and controlling its own workers on the owner's premises.
In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Kopp. 121 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio
App. 1954), the court held the contractor liable for indemnity
under contract language extending to injury "growing out of or in
any way connected with the performance of the work awarded to
Contractor."
In Crews Well Service v. Texas Co., 358 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.
1962), the court required the contractor to indemnify the owner
under a contract extending to claims "arising out of or in
connection with the performance of said work."
In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp.. 316 F.2d 287
(5th Cir. 1963), the court applied Texas law to affirm indemnity to
the owner under an agreement providing indemnity for damages "which
arises out of or in connection with the activities of contractor,
contractor's servants, agents and employees."
18

Freund requires that the breadth of the language employed
should manifest a conscious effort by the parties to express
their intent to indemnify. The Freund opinion noted that the use
in that case of terms such as "full and complete" indemnification
were significant.

793 P.2d at 371-72. Likewise in the instant

case, Article 15 uses the broadest language possible.
The Freund opinion required indemnity despite noting that
the contract language did not specifically mention the effect of
any negligence on the part of the licensor/indemnitee, Utah Power
& Light.

793 P.2d at 371. Likewise in this case, the agreement

does not specifically mention the effect of any negligence on the
part of the City.

However, in both the Freund case and in the

instant case, the language broadly covers any and all liabilities
which may arise out of the work which is the subject of the
agreement.

In Reynolds Metals Co. v. J. U. Schickli & Bros., Inc., 548
S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1977), the court affirmed indemnity for "any
liability or damages arising out of or resulting from contractor's
presence or presence of contractor's employees on owner's
premises."
In Rovnak v. Union Carbide Corp., 407 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App.
1978), the court affirmed indemnity from the contractor to the
owner under an agreement covering "any injuries sustained by
contractor's employees on the work site."
In Richmond v. Amoco Production Co. . 390 F. Supp. 673 (D.C.
Tex. 1975), the court required the contractor to indemnify the
owner under an agreement covering injuries "incident to or arising
out of, the performance of this contract."
19

The

indemnity agreement

by Projects Unlimited

is more

favorable toward indemnity than the agreement applied in the
Freund

decision

in one significant

aspect:

The

indemnity

agreement by Projects Unlimited expressly extends to claims made
by employees of the parties, including of course employees of
Projects Unlimited, which was the status of James Ericksen. Thus
the indemnity agreement in this case expressly includes claims
such as the one at issue in this case. Likewise in the Shell v.
Brinkerhoff case, the indemnity agreement expressly extended to
employees of Brinkerhoff, the contractor/indemnitor, and this
circumstance was important to the court in allowing Shell the
opportunity to prove indemnity in that case.

Shell Oil Co. v.

Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. . 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1983).
This is not a case where Salt Lake City seeks indemnity for
its "sole negligence". The agreement imposes no such limitation.
Further, the jury verdict at trial was that the accident was
caused by negligence of Projects Unlimited employee Ericksen
(10%); negligence of Projects Unlimited employees other than
Ericksen

(40%) ; and negligence of Salt Lake City during the

inspection (50%).

Any rule disfavoring indemnity for the sole

negligence of the indemnitee is simply not applicable, cf. Utah
Code Ann. § 13-8-1 (declaring such "sole negligence" indemnity
provisions

in

unenforceable) .

construction

contracts

to

be

void

and

This distinction was made in the Shell v.

Brinkerhoff opinion, 658 P.2d at 1190 n. 2.
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CONCLUSION
Governmental immunity for inspections benefits all citizens
who pay for or use public goods and services.

The Court should

reverse the denial of summary judgment to Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake Airport Authority against Ericksen.
The

written

agreement

requires

Projects

Unlimited

to

indemnify Salt Lake City for all claims which may arise out of
Projects Unlimited's work or other activity related in any way to
the project.

The Court should reverse the summary judgment in

favor of Projects Unlimited and the denial of Salt Lake City's
Motion for Summary Judgment against Projects Unlimited, and
remand to the district court for entry of judgment for litigation
expenses against Projects Unlimited.
If the Court grants Ericksen judgment on his cross-appeal
for damages against Salt Lake City in amounts attributable to the
negligence of Projects Unlimited, then the Court should hold that
the agreement requires Projects Unlimited to indemnify for those
amounts.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1991.
STRONG & HANNT>--^

^Roger ^H^JBtillock
Attorneys for Defendants,
Appellants and CrossAppellants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this 23rd day
of October, 1991, to the following:
Ned P. Siegfried
John Farrell Fay
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for James D. Ericksen
Bruce Jones
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Projects Unlimited, Inc.
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ADDENDUM
1. Agreement between Salt Lake City and Projects
Unlimited.
2. Order and Judgment in favor of Projects Unlimited.
3. Judgment on Special Verdict.
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For

.

Ptarytrrx Kin. ^ F > A - »S3 - 3
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the
^
day of
APRH
, 19 S£> by and between SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a
municipal corporation of the State of Utah, (hereinafter "CITY") and
(hereinafter ,fC0NTRACTORn) whose address is: 5 Q ? . i^-^rr

FT-4oo^br>orrw

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the City intends to have completed and Contractor agrees to perform the work as set forth in the contract documents (hereinafter the
work or the project) for Project No. 19-A-153-3, Airport Maintenance
Facilities, Phase II; and
WHEREAS, the contractor for the sum and under terms and conditions herein
stated agrees to perform the work.
NOW, THEREFORE, the City and the Contractor for the consideration hereinafter provided, agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1. SCOPE OF WORK. The Contractor agrees to furnish all labor,
materials and equipment to complete the said work as required in the drawings and specifications which are hereby made a part of this' contract by
reference. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that all
work shall be performed as required in the drawings and specifications
and shall be subject to inspection and approval of the City or its authorized representative. The relationship of the Contractor to the City hereunder is that of an independent contractor.
ARTICLE 2. TIME OF COMPLETION. The work under this Contract shall be
commenced upon Notice to Proceed and shall be completed in accordance with the
Contract Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3.
ARTICLE 3. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. Time is the essence of this Contract. The
Contractor agrees that for each and every day any portion of the work remains
incomplete after the time herein fixed by the City or within such additional
time as may have been allowed by written extension, the City shall deduct and
retain out of the money which may be due or become due said Contractor, or
Contractor shall pay to the City, the sum or sums indicated in the Contract
Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3, for each and every calendar day the
work remains incomplete after the date fixed therein for completion. Said sum
is, in view of the difficulty of determining City's damages, hereby agreed
upon, fixed and determined by the parties hereto as liquidated compensatory
damages that the City will suffer by reason of the failure of the Contractor
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to coirplete the work within the time agreed uponf and such daily compensation
shall apply to each portion of said work after the time herein agreed upon for
its completion•
Permitting the Contractor to continue and finish the work or any part of

it after the time fixed

for its

completion or after

the date to which the

time for completion may have been extended, shall in no way operate as a
waiver on the part of the City of any of its rights under this Agreement,
ARTICLE 4. CONTRACT SUM. The City agrees to pay and the Contractor agrees to
accept for full performance of this Contract, the sum bid by the Contractor in
his Proposal (page P-l) • The contract sum also includes the cost of all
bonds, insurance, permits and fees required herein and all charges, expenses
or assessments of whatever kind or character. No claim for services furnished
by the Contractor not specifically provided for herein shall be honored by
City.
ARTICLE 5. PAYMENT. The City agrees to pay the Contractor from time to
time as the work progresses, but not more than once each month after date
of Notice to Proceed, and only upon written certification by the Engineer.
Within 30 calendar days of the time the Deputy Director approves any partial
payment, the City will prepare a check for payment.
ARTICLE 6. PAYMENT FOR MATERIALS ON HAND. There shall be no paynent for
stored materials. Payment for materials shall be made only after the
materials are incorporated into the project.
ARTICLE 7. SALES TAXES. The City is exempt from sales taxes on property
sold directly to it. Therefore, the City reserves the right for any equipment or materials (exceeding $500 in value) to be ordered by the Contractor
for use hereunder, to require that the City be billed directly by the
supplier, after issuance of a City purchase order, at the Contractor's net
cost less any applicable discounts. The City cost for such equipment or
material less an amount equal to the sales tax which would otherwise be applicable, if any, shall be deducted from sums due the Contractor hereunder.
ARTICLE 8. INDEBTEDNESS. Before final payment is made, the Contractor
must submit evidence satisfactory to the City that all payrolls, material
bills, subcontracts and all outstanding indebtedness in connection with the
work have been paid or that arrangements have been made for their payment.
Payment will be made without unnecessary delay after receipt of such evidence as mentioned above and final acceptance of the work by the City.
ARTICLE 9. SCHEDULE OF WAGES. Deleted.
ARTICLE 10. ADDITIONAL WORK. It is understood and agreed by the parties
hereto that no money will be paid to the Contractor for any new or additional labor or materials furnished, as defined in Section GP 6.02, unless
a new contract or a modification hereof for such additional materials or
labor has been made in writing and executed by the City and Contractor.
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The City specifically reserves the right to modify or amend this Contract
and the total sum due hereunder, either by enlarging or restricting the
scope of the work.
ARTICLE 11. ACCEPTANCE. The- Vvork will be inspected for acceptance by
the Engineer within a reasonable time upon receipt of notice from vthe
Contractor that the work is complete and ready for inspection.
ARTICLE 12. DISPUTES.
a.

Except as otherwise provided in this Contractf any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this Contract, which is
not disposed of by written agreement shall be decided by the Director
of Airports, who shall reduce his decision to writing, and nail or
otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision
of said* Director shall be final and conclusive unlessf within 30
days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails
or otherwise furnishes to said Director a written appeal. The
decision of the Director or his duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals, shall be final and
conclusive. This provision shall not be pleaded in any suit involving a question of fact arising under this Contract as limiting juducial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by
such official or his representative is alleged. Provided, however, that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless
the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so .grossly
erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported
by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of the appeal.
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall
proceed diligently with the performance of the Contract and in accordance with the Director's decision.

b.

This dispute clause does not preclude consideration
of law in connection with decisions provided for in
(a) above. However, nothing in this Contract shall
as making final the decision of the Director or his
on a question of law.

of questions
Paragraph
be construed
representative

ARTICLE 13. DEFAULT AND REMEDY.
a.

If the Contractor shall be adjudged bankrupt or make a general
assignment for the benefits of creditors or if a receiver should
be appointed on account of insolvency, or if the Contractor or
any of his Subcontractors should violate any of the provisions
of this Contract, the City may serve written notice upon the
Contractor and the bonding company of its intention to terminate
all or any part of the Contract; and unless within 10 days after
the serving of such notice, such violation shall be corrected or
cease, to the City's satisfaction, the City then may take over
the work $nd prosecute it to completion by Contract or by any
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other method it may deem advisable and at the expense of the Contractor* The Contractor and the bonding company shall be liable
to the City for any excess cost occasioned * the City thereby.
b. Waiver of any default shall not be deemed to be a waives of any
subsequent default. Waiver of breach of any provision of this
Agreement shall not be construed to be irodification of the terms
of this Agreement, unless stated to be such in writing, signed
by the City*
c. The Contractor shall continue the performance of this Agreement
to the extent not cancelled under the provisions of this clause.
d. The rights and remedies of the City provided in this clause
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights
and remedies provided by law or under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 14. CITY'S RIGHT TO WITHHOLD CERTAIN AMOUNTS AND MAKE APPLICATION
THEREOF. 'The City may withhold from payment to the Contractor such an
amount or amounts asf in its judgmentf may be necessary to pay just claims
against the Contractor or any Subcontractor for damages, labor and services
rendered and materials furnished in and about the work. The City may apply
any such withheld amounts on the payment of such claims in its discretion.
In so doing, the City shall be deemed the agent of the Contractor and payments so made by the City shall be considered as a payment made under the
Contract by the City to the Contractor and the City shall not be liable to
the Contractor for any such payments made in good faith.
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor agrees to at all times protect,
indemnify, save hamless and defend the City, its agents and enployees from
any and all claims, demands, judgments, expenses, inclduing reasonable
attorney's feesr and all other damages of every kind and nature made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf of any person or persons whomsoever, including the parties hereto and their employees, which may arise out of any
act or failure to act, work or other activity related in any way to the
project, by the said Contractor, its agentsf subcontractors, materialmen
or employees in the performance and execution of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 16. SUBCONTRACTOR OR SUPPLIER. No part of this Contract shall
be sublet by the Contractor without the prior written approval of the City.
The Contractor and the City for themselves, their heirs, successors, executors, and administrators, hereby agree to the full performance of the
covenants herein contained. The Contractor also agrees to require in any
subcontract it makes in connection herewith that the subcontractor shall
be subject to all of the provisions and requirements of this Contract.
ARTICLE 17. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS. This Agreement consists of the docuirents listed under Section 1.06" of the General Provisions attached, all
of which are made a part hereof and none of which can be altered, except
in writing signed' by both parti.es.
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ARTICLE 18. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, The right is reserved to the
owners of public utilities and franchises to enter upon the street or worksite for the purpose of making repairs or changes of their property that
may become necessary by the work. The City shall also have the privilege
of entering upon the street or worksite for the purpose of repairing sewers,
or making house-drain connections therewith, or repairing culverts, storm
drains, water system repairs or adjustments and any and all other necessary
city work,
ARTICLE 19. CONTROLLING LAW. This Agreement shall be construed in accorance with and enforced under the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day
and year first above written.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION

By /tlJLiA^y

L* ff/L<*A

V^W^6
ernrracoRDER

(WJUMCTgP (Seal)

T/SftT
APPROVED

APR 151986
CIIX RECORDER
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(%&&0&yC

(Seal)

CITY' ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake)
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared
before me
and
,
vfao being by me duly sworn, did say that they are the MAYOR and CITY
RECORDER, respectively, of SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION," and said persons
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

ACKNOWLECOENT FOR CORPORATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of S a l t Lake)
On the *Q
d a y of A P R i i_
/ 19££y p e r s o n a l l y appeared
before me
P M I L f-/oC^rrPTT(?g
_ ' w t l ° being by me duly sworn,
did say t h a t he i s t h e y/, r - "PSA^M o c r x r r of ^GDK&rTS
t )hJi , A^CTFin
, and t h a t t h e fofegomg instrument was
signed i n behalf of s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n by a u t h o r i t y of r . n ^ p ^ ^ C T ^
"fiv/ \ / s i o ^
; and said P M I <
^Irr^
acknowledged t o me t h a t s a i d corporation executed t h e same.

•fl&AjCJUO&rylL
NOTARY PUBLIC,

residing in

5 U \ LitMy Commission E x p i r e s :
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FWL£BDIST2!£T5»»J2T
Third Judicial District

MAR 0 8 1991
BRUCE T. JONES, ESQ. (#17 32)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. (#4658)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES D. ERICKSEN,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT
AUTHORITY,
Defendants.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. C88-637
vs.
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.

Third-Party Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Projects"), brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third-Party
Complaint of Salt .Lake City Corporation against Projects, requesting that the Court grant judgment in favor of Projects.

Salt

Lake City Corporation brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
against Projects.
Projects moved the Court on the grounds that the express language of the construction Agreement dated April 9, 1986,
between the parties, and in particular ARTICLE 15 contained
therein respecting indemnification, does not extend to allegations of Salt Lake City's own negligence.

Pursuant to Utah's

Comparative Negligence provisions, the plaintiff can only recover
from Salt Lake City in this action the amount of damages equivalent to the proportion of fault attributable to Salt Lake City.l
As a consequence of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,2 where
the plaintiff has brought an action alleging negligence by Salt
Lake City in a job-related injury, the potential liability of
Projects (the former employer of plaintiff at the time of the
injury) to Salt Lake City, if any, can only arise from a contract
of indemnification wherein Projects clearly and unequivocally
agrees to indemnify Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own
negligence. Salt Lake City, and indirectly the plaintiff, cannot
recover from Projects except where Projects has clearly and
unequivocally waived the bar afforded Projects by the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

Salt Lake City cannot here maintain a third-

party action against Projects because there is no clear and
1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1986), as amended.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended.

- 2 -

unequivocal indemnification expressed in the Agreement between
the parties whereby Projects indemnifies or agrees to defend
Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own negligence.
The Court having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the
parties, considered the admissible evidence proffered by the
parties, and heard the oral arguments of counsel at a hearing
held on March 4, 1991, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Third-Party

Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. is granted, thereby dismissing
the Third-Party Complaint of Salt Lake City with prejudice.
The causes of action alleged in the Third-Party Complaint are
barred by Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-60 (1953), as amended, there being no clear and unequivocal
waiver of the bar expressed in the construction Agreement between
the parties requiring Projects to indemnify or defend Salt Lake
City from or against allegations of Salt Lake City's own negligence .
2.

The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Salt

Lake City Corporation is denied.
3.

That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor

of Third-Party Defendant Projects and against Third-Party Plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation.

- 3 / i t »•

'

Z<\

DATED this

% ~~ day of March, 1991
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE KENNETH R^GTRUP

f'V

> SVC/

)'///7(/V
v ' J'

j-Sf

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

(^

day of March, 1991, to:

Roger H. Bullock, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ned P. Siegfried, Esq.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

BTJ1I.10
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JAMES D. ERICKSEN,

9l\*o45 \1

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. C88-637
JUDGEMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICT

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY

Defendants.
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
oooOooo
This action came on regularly for trial on the 5th day of
March, 1991 in Department 4 of the above entitled Court, the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding;
That said parties appeared by their attorneys, John Farrell
Fay,

Counsel

Defendant.

for

Plaintiff

and

Roger

Bullock,

Counsel

for

A jury of eight persons was impaneled and sworn.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. After hearing the evidence and
arguments of counsel, the jury was duly instructed by the Court and
the cause was submitted to jury with directions to return a verdict

em

on special issues.

The jury deliberated and thereafter returned

into court with its verdict consisting of the special issues
submitted to

the jury and the answers given thereto by the jury,

which said verdict was in words and figures, as follows, to-wit:
We, the jury in the above entitled action, find the following
Special Verdict on the questions submitted to us:
1. Was Salt Lake City Corporation negligent as forth in these
instructions?
Answer:
2.

Yes

If so, was Salt Lake City's conduct a proximate cause of

the accident to plaintiff James Ericksen?
Answer:

Yes

If you have answered both of the above questions "yes" then
please go on.

If you have answered either of the above questions

"no" you will not answer the remaining questions but will simply
sign the verdict.
That is, if you find that the defendant's conduct was not
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident, then simply
sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are done. On
the other hand, if you find that the defendant's conduct was
negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, then go on.
3.

Was plaintiff James Ericksen negligent as set forth in

these instructions?
2
n f \ ' V *****

Answer:
A.

Yes
James Ericksen f s own conduct a

If so, was plaintiff

proximate cause of the accident?
Answer:
5.

Yes

Was Projects Unlimited negligent as set forth in these

instructions through the conduct of officers or employees other
than James Ericksen?
Answer:
6.

Yes

If so, was Projects UnlimitedTs conduct a proximate

cause

of the accident?
Answer;
7.

Yes

Based upon a total percentage of 100%, set forth in the

spaces below the percentage of negligence which proximately caused
the accident which is attributable to each of the following.
should attribute percentages only to

You

those parties which you have

found guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident in
response to questions 1 through 6 above.
Plaintiff James Ericksen

10%

Defendant Salt Lake City

50%

Projects Unlimited Inc.

40%

TOTAL MUST BE
Note:

100%

If you attribute 50% or more of the negligence to

plaintiff James Ericksen, you need not answer any further question.
3

Of)

If you attribute less than 50% of the negligence to plaintiff James
Ericksen, then answer the following questions:
8.

What amount of damages, if any, do you find from a

preponderance

of the

evidence that plaintiff

sustained

as a

proximate result of the accident of March 5, 1987?
Past medical expenses:

$3,300.00

Past lost wages:

7,900.00

Future medical expenses,
future lost earnings, pain,
suffering, and other future
damage s:
175,000.00
TOTAL:

$186,200.00

Dated this 7th day of March 1991.

Karen Emerson
Foreperson

It appearing that by reason of said special verdict:
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen is entitled to Judgement in
the amount of *7*f ffiZ — »

This represents $5,600.00 in special

damages plus interest at 8% for 4 years and general damages in the
amount of $87,500.00.

W *• >* % # \

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen recover costs and disbursements
taxes in the sum of

\4-

* biZ.

I.

Dated: Mul'dli 12-, 1991
JUHGE ^OF THE DISjRiqJp "COURT
Judgement is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff against
the Defendants in Third District Court in the County of Salt Lake,
Book no.

, on page no.

, on

, 1991.
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